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Colorado Supreme Court Grants Trial Judges Power to Resentence After Partial Appeals, Sparking Dissent

A 5-2 ruling gives trial judges inherent authority to reassess sentences when an appeal overturns some convictions, unless the appellate court explicitly forbids it. The dissent warns this invites judges to exceed remand instructions and could force appellate courts to list everything they cannot do.

Colorado Supreme Court Grants Trial Judges Power to Resentence After Partial Appeals, Sparking Dissent

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled Monday that trial judges have the inherent authority to resentence a defendant when an appellate court overturns some but not all of their convictions, provided the appellate order does not explicitly prohibit further changes. The 5-2 decision, stemming from a Jefferson County case, reshapes how sentencing packages are handled after successful appeals and drew a sharp dissent warning of expanded trial court power.

Justice Carlos A. Samour Jr., writing for the majority in Hernandez-Escajeda v. People, said that removing even one component of a sentencing package on appeal can distort the ultimate punishment. He wrote that as long as the Court of Appeals’ instructions are silent on the matter, a trial judge “may — but is not required to — reassess the sentence imposed on any remaining conviction.”

The case involved Octavio Hernandez-Escajeda, who pleaded guilty to burglary and assault in Jefferson County. He faced up to 32 years on each count, to run consecutively, but the judge imposed 22 years on each count, also consecutive. Hernandez-Escajeda later sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated double jeopardy because the assault was based on the same conduct as the burglary. The Court of Appeals agreed and ordered the trial court to vacate the assault conviction and adjust the sentencing document accordingly.

The prosecution then asked for a full resentencing. At a February 2023 hearing, District Court Judge Russell Klein declined, noting that the appellate opinion’s language suggested a new sentencing was not appropriate. “Normally, when the court gets opinions back from the Court of Appeals,” Klein said, “they say what they mean and they mean what they say.”

The prosecution appealed the resulting 22-year sentence on the remaining burglary count. A different Court of Appeals panel found that nothing in the prior decision barred Klein from imposing a new sentence, reasoning that the earlier directive to perform a specific action did not prohibit other actions the district court had authority to take, as long as they did not conflict with the remand instructions.

Hernandez-Escajeda then turned to the Supreme Court, arguing that the first appellate panel had given clear instructions that Klein simply followed. During oral arguments, Samour asked whether it would have been permissible for the appeals court to explicitly remand for a review of the entire sentencing package. Public defender Kamela Maktabi said no, because Colorado, unlike federal courts, has not adopted the “sentencing package” practice that allows blanket resentencing after a successful appeal.

The Jefferson County district attorney’s office argued that fairness required a new sentence when a sentencing package is disrupted. Justice Richard L. Gabriel pushed back during arguments, saying the prosecution’s approach “seems like a second bite at the apple to me. The prosecutor doesn’t like the sentence that remains after it lost on appeal. Now it wants more.”

In the majority opinion, Samour formally embraced the sentencing package concept, writing that the only way to determine whether the trial court would have imposed a different sentence on the remaining count is to allow it to exercise broad discretion on remand. He stressed that trial judges may decline to adjust the remaining sentence, as Klein did, and that if they do resentence, they should consider circumstances after conviction and cannot allow parties to introduce issues that could have been raised at the original sentencing.

“Nothing we say today should be understood as giving trial courts a blank check to take actions inconsistent with the remand instructions,” Samour wrote. He added that appellate courts should now consider whether resentencing may be appropriate and address that question expressly in future cases.

Chief Justice Monica M. Márquez dissented, joined by Gabriel. She argued that the majority’s ruling effectively allows trial judges to go beyond a basic mandate to vacate a conviction and adjust the sentencing document, with no clear limit. “The majority’s ruling invites trial courts to infer that they have authority to do anything not expressly prohibited by a mandate,” she wrote. “Equally problematic, the majority’s new rule will require appellate courts to write comprehensive remand instructions in the negative; arguably, remand orders must now list everything a lower court cannot do on remand.”

Márquez distinguished between general and specific remand orders, noting that the directive in Hernandez-Escajeda’s case was specific and that Klein followed it. She argued that the majority’s reasoning applies more broadly than the facts of this case. “Contrary to this court’s case law reaching back more than a century, the majority holds, for the first time, that a trial court is free to wander beyond the parameters of a specific mandate unless the mandate’s instructions expressly prohibit a particular action,” she wrote. “Right or wrong, under this court’s case law, the specific instructions defined the limit of the trial court’s authority to act on remand — and those instructions did not include resentencing.”

The decision is likely to affect how prosecutors and defense attorneys approach appeals that partially overturn convictions, and it places new expectations on appellate courts to be explicit about whether resentencing is permitted. For defendants who win a partial reversal, the ruling means their remaining sentence could be revisited — either reduced or increased — depending on the trial judge’s assessment of the original sentencing intent.

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