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Colorado Appeals Court Upholds Boulder County Forgery Convictions, Divided Over Excluded Settlement Evidence
A divided Colorado Court of Appeals panel upheld John Edward Cruz's forgery and theft convictions, ruling that a trial judge properly excluded evidence of civil settlements between Cruz and his accuser. The dissent argued the $200,000 payment could have altered jurors' view of the victim's credibility.
A sharply divided Colorado Court of Appeals panel has upheld the forgery and theft-related convictions of a Boulder County man, ruling 2-1 that a trial judge did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by barring the jury from hearing about civil settlements between the defendant and the man he was accused of defrauding.
The case, People v. Cruz, decided October 29, stems from John Edward Cruz's attempt to sell a farm he partially owned with Miguel Cerceda. Jurors convicted Cruz on multiple counts of attempted theft, perjury, identity theft, forgery, and related offenses. Prosecutors presented evidence that Cruz transferred the property without authorization and using forged documents. Cruz argued that Cerceda had given him authority to sell the farm.
At trial, the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of several civil lawsuits Cruz filed against Cerceda after Cerceda reported Cruz to police. Cruz had sued Cerceda over his management of the farm and another business Cruz invested in. The men reached a settlement in which Cerceda agreed to pay Cruz $200,000. Months later, Cruz sued again for payments owed, leading to a second settlement.
Retired Judge Kenneth M. Laff, who oversaw the trial, initially acknowledged that "the fact that Mr. Cerceda was sued and paid $200,000 is a fact that could have a serious effect on the jury's deliberations." But he ultimately barred the evidence, saying the jury was already aware of animosity between the two men and that exploring the "complex" settlements could lead jurors to believe "that everyone's at fault here and a pox on both their houses and let's go home."
"The information of the civil suits is not relevant," Laff ruled, adding that "the discussion of it would be misleading unless we extend the trial by days."
Cruz appealed, arguing that excluding the settlements violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. His attorney, Patrick J. Mulligan, wrote that "the jury was entitled to know not only that Cerceda was angry with Cruz, but also that Cerceda carried a specific and substantial financial obligation to (Cruz)."
Judge Melissa C. Meirink, writing for herself and Judge Neeti V. Pawar, disagreed. She noted that trial judges have a responsibility to exclude evidence that is unfairly harmful, misleading, confusing, or could cause delays, even when a defendant's confrontation right is at stake.
Meirink reasoned that the timing of the civil suits undermined their relevance: the lawsuits and settlement occurred after Cerceda reported Cruz to law enforcement, making it unlikely a jury would view the payout as a motive for Cerceda to report Cruz. She also wrote that Laff was concerned the settlement information "could lead the jury to believe that Cerceda had done something wrong and had to pay Cruz," and that the context needed to understand the agreements "had the potential to confuse the jury." The defense, she added, had ample opportunity to explore Cerceda's own actions and feelings toward Cruz.
"Thus, allowing Cruz to cross-examine Cerceda on the settlement agreement and civil cases wouldn't have given the jury a 'significantly different impression' of Cerceda's credibility," Meirink concluded.
Judge Daniel M. Taubman dissented, writing that "the jurors never received information that Cerceda owed Cruz $200,000" and that such information "could have given the jurors a decidedly different view of Cerceda and Cruz, indicating not only that Cruz might have victimized Cerceda, but also that Cerceda had harmed Cruz."
Taubman argued that Laff could have limited the length of cross-examination if he was worried about prolonging the trial, but that excluding the settlements altogether violated Cruz's rights. He wrote that jurors might otherwise have perceived Cerceda as "a Good Samaritan who had reported a fraud against himself," rather than as someone testifying out of "vindictiveness, spite, or Cerceda's financial obligation under the settlement."
Because Cruz's defense was that he was authorized to sell the farm, evidence of the business settlement "could have given the jury a significantly different impression of Cerceda's credibility by supporting Cruz's theory that Cerceda shared blame in their business affairs," Taubman concluded.
The ruling leaves Cruz's convictions intact. The case is People v. Cruz.